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Federal Nuclear Preparedness and Response Measures Reflect 
New Modeling Paradigms 
We, the authors, would like to thank Dr. Robert Harney for advancing the dialogue on 
nuclear preparedness in his recent article “Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapons 
Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness” which was 
published in the September 2009 issue of this journal.  
We agree with Harney’s main conclusions that the size of a nuclear attack by 
terrorists in the current era is likely to be much smaller than what was conceivable in 
the Cold War era, and that while the devastation would still be enormous, the attack 
presents the opportunity and responsibility for robust planning and effective response.  
As Harney says, “terrorist attacks, no matter how devastating, should not be made to 
appear hopeless” and “people should not be persuaded to believe that a terrorist-
initiated nuclear attack is the end of the world.”1  We also agree that appropriate actions 
of local, state, and federal governments in the hours and days after the attack will be 
critical for the survival of many, that short-term sheltering-in-place will reduce 
casualties caused by fallout, and that the average citizen can undertake steps to improve 
personal preparedness in advance that will help mitigate the consequences of the attack.  
Although we agree with Harney on some counts, we strongly disagree with three 
themes running through his article:  
1. That if nuclear attack consequence estimates produce too many casualties, 
preparedness and planning  efforts will be abandoned;  
2. That the federal government is using seriously flawed models to guide response 
preparations; and  
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3. That the estimates advanced in his article are more accurate than what is 
currently being used for national medical planning.  
Effectiveness of Response Strategies, Not the Precise Number of Casualties, 
Drives Federal Preparedness Actions 
Dr. Harney argues that numerically accurate predictions of casualties from a nuclear 
attack are critically important because if the attack produces more than a certain 
number of casualties, it would be considered too daunting to plan for. In contrast, 
because there are so many uncertainties related to the enemy acquiring, deploying, and 
detonating a nuclear device in the U.S., appropriate federal planning must consider a 
range of possible assumptions leading to a variety of casualty scenarios, even those that 
suggest a very large number. Furthermore, when considering the risk of a nuclear attack 
by terrorists, the uncertainty in the consequences of an attack is dwarfed by the 
uncertainty in the probability that the attack will occur at all. Even though the risk of an 
attack is uncertain, it is important to note that the federal government is expending 
effort to prepare and plan for a nuclear attack because it is recognized that even a 
relatively small detonation would result in an inordinate number of casualties. It is 
useful to plan carefully and thoughtfully to minimize the consequence of any nuclear 
event, even those in which the potential number of lives saved is small compared to the 
number of lives lost.  
Although federal studies typically utilize a 10 kT detonation for planning purposes, a 
variety of weapon yields and heights of burst are being considered.  That being said, the 
worthiness of preparedness efforts is determined by the lives saved by effective actions, 
not the lives lost in the attack. It is for this reason that the exact number of casualties is 
secondary to the relative effectiveness of the response itself. Some readers of Harney’s 
article may mistakenly believe that because a nuclear attack may, in some unlikely 
scenarios, produce millions of casualties (unlike Harney’s estimates), that government 
preparedness efforts amount to capitulation.2  
The fact that many of the preparedness actions being taken by the federal 
government are not public may have led Harney to suggest that the U.S. government is 
not actively planning for an attack. In fact, the federal government is actively engaged 
not only in preventing, but in planning for a coordinated, effective response to a nuclear 
attack. This work is challenging and complex, but necessary and is an integral part of the 
U.S. government’s “all hazards” response paradigm. 
The authors of this letter agree with Harney that a nuclear event would initially 
overwhelm local and regional hospital capacity, and therefore, the federal government 
actively plans for establishing an effective, coordinated national-level medical treatment 
response with state and local governments in coordination with the U.S. Departments of 
Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, Transportation,  and 
Defense and all agencies identified in the National Response Framework.  
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 While much remains to be accomplished, actions taken to date that support nuclear 
response include:3  
• Funding model development and analysis of urban nuclear attacks impacts; 
• Developing guidance for state and local governments regarding local 
preparedness and response to a nuclear attack;4 
• Developing playbooks, which are currently being updated and revised based on 
the newest modeling results, to help define how the federal response supports 
state and local response to a nuclear incident;  
• Developing a federal nuclear strategic plan, and response concept plan (currently 
in draft form); 
• Providing guidance for worker health and safety, and long-term restoration;5 
• Augmenting FEMA’s capabilities to respond to a nuclear attack; 
• Providing guidance on the medical management of radiation injury (Radiation 
Event Medical Management web portal (REMM), developed by HHS);6 
• Developing guidance to provide the greatest level of care in a setting in which 
resources are scarce while minimizing the risk posed to medical responders;7  
• Improving the coordination of the evacuation of victims from major incidents;  
• Tracking the availability of hospital bed capacity across the U.S., diverting 
patients to hospitals with adequate capacity and adding additional capacity, 
including specialty care for radiation injury;8  
• Developing systems for the tracking of victims who have been evacuated to 
facilitate reunion with their families; 
• Identifying which medical resources are likely to be in the shortest supply after 
an attack and supplementing these resources with federal and local caches;9 
• Supporting the development of biodosimetry capacity to identify victims who 
should be given aggressive care to minimize radiation injury and maximize 
resource utilization; 
• Ensuring connectivity of emergency communications; 
• Developing and promulgating sound guidance related to evacuation vs. sheltering 
in place; 
• Ensuring continuity of government (COG), continuity of operations (COOP), and 
continuity of essential services (COES) planning at the federal, state, and local 
levels;  
• Developing stockpiles of resources and conducting research and development for 
more effective medical countermeasures;10 
• Developing means to work with the private sector to ensure the acquisition and 
deployment of cost-effective and adequate supplies of countermeasures against 
acute radiation sickness. 
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Planning and Preparedness Efforts of the Federal Government are 
Based on Realistic Modeling 
Casualty modeling (prediction of casualty numbers, locations, and types) in support of 
response planning, while imprecise, has improved greatly in recent years, and these 
numbers certainly inform the strategy and  tactics behind the evolving federal response 
strategies. Using current models, planning is underway to maximize the efficient use of 
the limited number of health care providers and resources, ensure that responders know 
how to respond to radiation events, consider the operational difficulties of the post-
nuclear blast environment, develop strategies to bring casualties to facilities with extra 
capacity, and carefully and ethically consider the use of scarce resources. For these 
efforts, accurate models are important, which, is why we found Harney’s comment 
disturbing:  “Such ‘excessive’ estimates have been used to establish emergency response 
planning guidance. It remains to be seen whether this will result in over-preparation or 
under-preparation. Neither is desirable.”11 We believe good fidelity casualty estimates 
are critical to planning, and we believe the federal government has done the most 
comprehensive analysis of urban nuclear detonation impacts to date.  
Despite the importance of accurate models, Dr. Harney concluded that the federal 
government is performing shoddy modeling. Because he doesn’t explain his claim, we 
are unsure what information was used to support his conclusion. The specific document 
he cites for his claim that “excessive” estimates have been used to establish emergency 
planning guidance is the federal interagency “Planning Guidance for Response to a 
Nuclear Detonation” published by the Executive Office of the President.12 This 
document was designed to assist state and local emergency response officials in 
developing local response plans to a nuclear attack and therefore does not discuss model 
details of little interest to policymakers.  It is, however, based on extensive modeling and 
analysis. 
We recognize that Dr. Harney does not have the benefit of the most current analyses 
of urban nuclear impacts that served as the technical underpinnings for the “Planning 
Guidance” he references.  Under contract13 to the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Health and Human Services, the nation’s nuclear weapons 
laboratories have undertaken detailed and in-depth modeling , simulation, and analysis 
of nuclear impacts on the urban cityscape and on human health, accounting for blast 
resilience of numerous building structural types, glass varieties in building construction, 
the attenuation of prompt neutron and gamma radiation by urban structures, rubble 
generation, fire potential, EMP, fallout generation and deposition from a ground-level 
explosion, and impacts on critical infrastructure. Optimized post-detonation shelter and 
evacuation strategies are being developed. Investigators are leveraging Cold War nuclear 
test data and Japanese data to validate results and numerous other data sources were 
mined in this effort, and with application of the most current modeling techniques the 
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authors believe this work constitutes the most comprehensive analysis of the urban 
nuclear attack to date.  
That being said, we question why Harney concluded that the modeling used to 
support this document was erroneous. In fact, comparison of Harney’s casualty 
estimates and those from the “Planning Guidance” reveals close agreement. For 
example, Harney wrongly assumes that federal guidance assumes an airburst, whereas 
the blast effect distances provided in the “Planning Guidance”14 are based on surface 
bursts. The estimates for blast effects in the document match those for a surface burst 
provided by Harney.15 (Compare Harney’s estimate of 5psi at 0.97km to 5psi at 0.9km in 
the guidance.)   
It should be clear that the “Planning Guidance”16 and most post-9/11 federal planning 
documents primarily consider terrorist-delivered surface nuclear detonations rather 
than airbursts from warheads delivered by missiles or aircraft. Because these models 
consider ground-level detonations, the models consider attenuation of the prompt 
thermal and ionizing radiation caused by buildings and a slightly attenuated blast wave. 
Nonetheless, various altitude bursts as well as a wider range of yields than those 
discussed by Harney have also been investigated and modeled to ensure preparedness 
for a wide range of possible scenarios.     
Casualties Produced by a Nuclear Weapon Will Likely Exceed 
Harney’s Estimate 
There are several factors that will significantly contribute to the number of casualties 
that Harney may not have adequately considered in his models. First, fallout could 
generate many casualties if victims do not receive or cannot perform the recommended 
protective actions, like sheltering-in place. Dr. Harney appears to agree that fallout may 
produce more casualties than the other effects of the bomb. He suggests (and we do not 
dispute) that a 20 square kilometer area may be blanketed with enough fallout to kill 
inadequately sheltered victims after a few hours exposure in some scenarios.  Although 
effective evacuation of the target city could greatly reduce fallout casualties, all studies 
of the evacuation of cities17 (and practical experience from the evacuation for hurricanes 
and daily rush hour) suggest that great numbers of potential victims will likely be 
trapped for hours in their motionless cars (poor shelters against fallout) or attempt to 
walk out rather than sheltering in heavy buildings. To improve the chance that the 
public will understand and follow actions to reduce their exposure to fallout, education 
and communication programs are currently in progress. Nonetheless, responsible 
planning and preparedness measures must consider that many victims will present with 
acute radiation sickness caused by fallout. For these victims, research is underway to 
develop effective treatments and to effectively deploy today’s medical countermeasures. 
Second, regarding thermal injury, Harney discounts burn victims based on the fact 
that opaque objects effectively block the thermal energy from a detonation. Some 
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models indicate that the number and severity of prompt burn cases will be substantially 
diminished in a ground burst. However, he fails to consider that the source of the 
thermal energy, the fireball, rises very quickly. In fact, a detailed, publicly available 
analysis has shown that, although a weapon may be detonated on the ground, the burst 
may cause burns distant from the point of detonation in a modern city because the 
fireball will rapidly rise above the height of buildings.18 Depending on meteorological 
conditions, thermal energy can also reflect off clouds and burn those without line of 
sight to the source (called “sky shine”). Furthermore, burns substantially reduce 
survivability when combined with any other injury type. Similarly, although the prompt 
ionizing radiation emitted by the detonation is attenuated by solid objects, scattering 
can cause substantial non-linearity through a city, leading to surprisingly high doses 
even behind robust structures. Unpublished analysis by Applied Research Associates, in 
which energetic particles emitted in a nuclear detonation were traced through a three-
dimensional model of a U.S. city, estimated how much dose an individual would receive 
in various distances from the detonation via direct line of sight and scattering.  
Third, Harney appears to omit the contribution of temporary flash blindness to the 
casualty pool. Although retinal scarring will occur only in those with a direct line of site 
of the detonation, many may be temporarily blinded by the bright flash even if they do 
not directly view the explosion. Although flash blindness victims will recover their 
eyesight after a brief period, many are likely to be driving at the time resulting in a 
significant number to auto accidents. The distance out to which temporary blindness 
occurs is a function of the ambient brightness (as the iris contracts in the day but is 
wider at night), albedo (the reflectivity of the sky on a cloudy or clear day), and any eye 
protection (sunglasses or tinted windows). Models in use consider that this effect could 
extend ten miles from the epicenter, and further at night.  And, fourth, the lack of 
medical resources may contribute to significant loss of life from otherwise treatable 
conditions, such as infections, although this is difficult to quantify. 
 
Finally, we, the authors, hope this letter has helped advance the dialogue on nuclear 
preparedness by clarifying that U.S. government preparedness strategy is based on 
sound consideration of the best science related to an urban nuclear attack. Further, we 
hope we emphasized that the federal approach to preparedness is suitable to various 
types of nuclear incidents, including those that produce many more and many fewer 
casualties than what some may consider the “most probable” scenario. Lastly, we feel it 
is important to emphasize that, even if we disagree on the magnitude of the impact of an 
attack, the federal government’s approach does not in any way include capitulation or 
appeasement, but accurate analysis and robust planning.  
 
The opinions, findings and conclusions in this letter are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the federal government, its 
departments, or components. 
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